Property—Zoning—The Courts Further Define Their Limited Role by Evans, Audrey Riemer
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 5 Issue 2 Article 5 
1982 
Property—Zoning—The Courts Further Define Their Limited Role 
Audrey Riemer Evans 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Audrey Riemer Evans, Property—Zoning—The Courts Further Define Their Limited Role, 5 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 279 (1982). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol5/iss2/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law 
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
PROPERTY-ZONING--THE COURTS FURTHER DEFINE THEIR
LIMITED ROLE. City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 619
S.W.2d 664 (1981).
The appellees, Breeding and Henderson, jointly owned a 1.8
acre tract of land which was annexed by the city of Little Rock and
zoned for residential use. This tract was bordered by apartment
complexes on the west, mini-warehouses on the south, vacant land
on the east, and a six-acre tract partially developed as residential on
the north.
The appellees requested rezoning from residential to commer-
cial. The Little Rock Planning Commission recommended to the
city board of directors that the appellees' request be denied, and,
accordingly, the city board of directors denied the request. Thereaf-
ter, the appellees filed suit in Pulaski County Chancery Court.
The chancellor found: "(1) that the property involved was lo-
cated in an established and expanding business district; (2) that the
Board of Directors acted in an arbitrary, capricious and unreasona-
ble manner in rejecting appellees' application. . . ."I The chancel-
lor then rezoned the property to commercial. The board of directors
appealed the chancellor's decision to the Arkansas Court of Ap-
peals,2 where the chancellor's decision was affirmed.
3
The Arkansas Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the
significant legal principles involved and reversed on every point.
The supreme court held that the property was not in an established
and expanding business district, that there was a reasonable basis
for the board's decision, and that placing the property in a specific
zoning classification was outside the purview of the judiciary. City
of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 619 S.W.2d 664 (1981).
The first comprehensive zoning ordinance in the United States
was adopted by New York City in 1916.4 This plan, which divided
1. City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 440, 619 S.W.2d 664, 666 (1981).
2. Zoning decisions were appealed directly to the Arkansas Supreme Court prior to the
passage of ARK. CONST. amend. 58 in May 1979. Amendment 58 changed this procedure,
and now the supreme court hears zoning questions only on a writ of certiorari.
3. City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 270 Ark. 752, 606 S.W.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1980).
4. N.Y. City, N.Y., Building Zone Ordinance (1916) (as cited in 1 R. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.02 n.8 (2d ed. 1976 & Supp. 1981)). The zoning process
involves the competition for rights in property between an individual and society. The pri-
vate property owner asserts his right to use his property as he chooses, while the public
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real estate into residential, business, and unrestricted districts, was
upheld by the New York Court as a proper exercise of police
power.' However, it was not until the 1926 landmark case of Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 6 that the United States Supreme
Court upheld zoning based upon the government's right to exercise
the police power for the public welfare.7
In Euclid the Supreme Court limited its holding to an approval
of the ordinance itself.8 In Nectow v. City of Cambridge9 the
Supreme Court considered the validity of the specific application of
a zoning ordinance to a parcel of land. The Court found the ordi-
nance as applied to the specific parcel unconstitutional because it
materially reduced the land value Without substantially promoting
the public health, safety, or general welfare.' °
These two decisions laid the foundation for judicial review of
zoning ordinances. I I They illustrate the two types of questions gen-
erally reviewed: alleged invalidity of the zoning ordinance as a
whole, and alleged invalidity of the ordinance as it affects a particu-
lar parcel. 2 In reviewing either category, the Supreme Court uses
the same standard. Before an ordinance or its effects on a particular
parcel can be declared unconstitutional, it must be "clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
asserts its right to interfere in order to benefit the entire community physically, socially, or
morally. See, e.g., Feiler, Zoning- A Guide to Judicial Review, 47 J. URB. L. 319 (1969).
5. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209 (1920).
6. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
7. For another explanation of the police power inherent in zoning see Rockhill v.
Township of Chesterfield, 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957), in which the court stated:
Zoning is in its essential policy and purpose a component of the reserve element of
sovereignty denominated the 'police power,' the sovereign right so to order the
affairs of the people as to serve the common social and economic needs, the princi-
ple that brought them together in civilized society for their mutual advantage and
welfare, to which all property is subject ....
Id. at 124-25, 128 A.2d at 477.
8. 272 U.S. at 397. See also 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.11 (2d
ed. 1976 & Supp. 1981).
9. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
10. Id. at 188.
11. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), in which Justice Stevens
stated:
With one minor exception, between the Nectow decision in 1928 and the 1974
decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas ...this Court did not review the sub-
stance of any zoning ordinances.. .. [D]uring the past half century the broad
formulations found in Euclid and Nectow have been applied in countless situations
by the state courts.
Id. at 514-15 (Stevens, J., concurring).
12. See 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 8, at § 3.11; Feller, supra note 4, at 324.
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health, safety, morals, or general welfare."' 13
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The local nature of the zoning decision has allowed each state
to develop its own variation of judicial review 14 based on custom, on
state statutes, 15 and on zoning enabling act requirements.' 6 Specific
provisions for the review of zoning decisions have been adopted in
all but a few states,'" and while there are differences in procedure,
the essential character of the review is the same.'8 As a general rule,
most American courts recognize that zoning is a legislative decision
and restrict their review to determining whether these decisions are
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.' 9
This was the standard of review applied in Herring v. Stannus,2 °
the first Arkansas zoning case.2' In Herring the court acknowledged
that zoning decisions are legislative, and, therefore, the court re-
stricted itself to ruling on the question whether the city's decision
was arbitrary and unreasonable.22 In establishing this standard of
review, 23 the court was following its precedents concerning judicial
13. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
14. In Oregon, when the rezoning of a specific piece of property is contested, the court
fully reviews the rezoning decision because local and small decision groups are simply not
equivalent to state and national legislatures and it would be ignoring reality to continue the
full presumption of validity. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23
(1973). See Wright, Zoning Law in Arkansas: A Comparative Ana sis, 3 UALR L.J. 421,
441 (1980).
In contrast to the full inquiry of the Oregon courts, the Wyoming courts recently have
refused to hear zoning reclassifications because such legislative action is not reviewable
under their Administrative Procedure Act. McGann v. City Council of Laramie, 581 P.2d
1104, 1107 n.5 (Wyo. 1978).
15. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW
§ 129 (1975).
16. E.g, MODEL LAND DEV. CODE (1975). Arkansas enabling legislation can be found
in ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-2804, -2825 to -2831 (1980).
17. 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 8, at § 25.02.
18. Id.
19. See 4 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 25-5 n.22 (4th ed. 1979), for a state
by state survey of the use of this standard of review. For a scholarly examination of the
origins of this standard of judicial review see S. GABIN, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE REA-
SONABLE DOUBT TEST (1980), in which the author asserts that Justice John Marshall found
that constitutional ambiguity required judicial deference to reasonable legislative interpreta-
tion, and traces the origins of the reasonable basis test to 1798.
20. 169 Ark. 244, 275 S.W. 321 (1925).
21. Herring upheld the constitutionality of the 1924 enabling act, ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 19-2804 (1980).
22. 169 Ark. at 256, 275 S.W. at 325; accord Riddell v. City of Brinkley, 272 Ark. 84,
612 S.W.2d 116 (1981).
23. Herring was decided one year after Euclid. "In the late 1930s, partly because of
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review of legislative decisions in general.24
Two years after the Herring decision, Little Rock v. Pfeifer25
was decided. The court in Pfeifer held that if residential property is
adjacent to an established and expanding business district, then a
refusal to rezone it from residential to commercial would be arbi-
trary.26 Pfeifer was a drastic departure from established zoning
principles. 27  If the Pfeifer rule is applied literally, the control of
commercial development and the creation of buffer zones become
impossible.28 While Herring had established judicial support of the
board of directors' discretion,29 Pfeifer undercut that support by de-
fining "arbitrary" in a manner contrary to zoning principles.3 °
In the early 1940s, judicial review became more complex and
confusion arose because two cases, McKinney v. City of Little Rock3 1
and City of Little Rock v. Bentley,32 created changing standards as
the litigants went through the reviewing process. In McKinney the
Arkansas Supreme Court refused to set aside the chancellor's de-
cree, saying it would substitute its judgment for that of the planning
commission only when there was evidence that the action of the
commission and the decision of the court were unreasonable and
arbitrary.3 The court in Bentley simplified McKinney to mean that
adverse reaction to Supreme Court interventions to overturn New Deal legislation, legal
opinion in the United States was shifting to the view that the judiciary should be much more
circumspect about interfering with legislative enactments." R. NELSON, ZONING AND PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS 26 (1977).
24. Eg., North Little Rock v. Rose, 136 Ark. 298, 206 S.W. 449 (1918); Pierce Oil Corp.
v. City of Hope, 127 Ark. 38, 191 S.W. 405 (1917), afl'd, 248 U.S. 498 (1919).
25. 169 Ark. 1027, 277 S.W. 883 (1925).
26. Id. at 1031, 277 S.W. at 885.
27. Gitelman, Judicial Review of Zoning in Arkansas, 23 ARK. L. REv. 22, 29 (1969).
For a thorough and updated analysis, see Wright, supra note 14, at 471.
28. Gitelman, supra note 27, at 29; Wright, supra note 14, at 471.
29. 169 Ark. at 256, 275 S.W. at 325. Zoning hearings begin in the planning commis-
sion and are reviewed by the city board of directors. Even though the planning commission
decides the original zoning question, that decision can be appealed to the city board of
directors. Thus, zoning authorities will be referred to as "board of directors." ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 19-2824 to -2833 (1980).
30. Wright, supra note 14, at 471-72.
31. 201 Ark. 618, 146 S.W.2d 167 (1941). This zoning dispute involved a refusal by the
board of directors to rezone the appellant's property from a residential to a commercial
classification. The chancery court upheld the city board's decision, and the case was ap-
pealed to the supreme court.
32. 204 Ark. 727, 165 S.W.2d 890 (1942). The appellant requested a change in the sta-
tus of his property from residential to commercial. After the board of directors denied the
request, the chancellor granted the rezoning. The supreme court used the chancellor's find-
ings of fact but not his application of law to those facts to reach the same result; refusal by
the board of directors to rezone was held to have been arbitrary.
33. 201 Ark. at 621, 146 S.W.2d at 169.
NOTES
the finding of the chancery court would not be disturbed when that
finding was not contrary to the preponderance of the evidence.34
Thus, Bentley established the precedent which allowed the Arkansas
Supreme Court to review only the evidence supporting the chancel-
lor's decision, while ignoring the evidence supporting the city's
decision.35
Subsequently, Act 134 of 1965 provided another standard of
review.36 This Act provided for a trial de novo in the circuit court
on appeal from a final action taken by an administrative, quasi-judi-
cial, or legislative agency pertaining to a building or zoning regula-
tion.37 Three zoning cases38 were decided by this process before this
statute was found to be unconstitutional in Wenderoth v. City of Fort
Smith 39 The court in Wenderoth explained the effect of a de novo
trial as the judicial branch acting as if the legislative branch had not
acted, subordinating the judgment of municipal lawmakers to the
judgment of a circuit court.4 This substituting process, although
authorized by a statute, was found to be unconstitutional.4'
The language in the Wenderoth decision has been used by the
Arkansas Supreme Court in stating the narrow inquiry allowed in
reviewing a zoning question.42 In Taylor v. City of Little Rock43 the
relationships between the city board, the chancery court, and the
34. 204 Ark. at 731, 165 S.W.2d at 892. See Gitelman, supra note 27, at 28, in which he
refers to this interpretation as a distortion of the McKinney holding.
35. See Gitelman, supra note 27, at 27-28; Wright, supra note 14, at 439-41; see also
City of Helena v. Barrow, 241 Ark. 654, 408 S.W.2d 867 (1966); City of Little Rock v. Miles,
240 Ark. 735, 401 S.W.2d 741 (1966); Lindsey v. City of Camden, 239 Ark. 736, 393 S.W.2d
864 (1965); City of Little Rock v. Garner, 235 Ark. 362, 360 S.W.2d 116 (1962); City of Little
Rock v. Hocott, 220 Ark. 421, 247 S.W.2d 1012 (1952); City of Little Rock v. Stannus, 218
Ark. 893, 239 S.W.2d 283 (1951); City of Little Rock v. Joyner, 212 Ark. 508, 206 S.W.2d 446
(1947).
36. ARK. STAT. ArN. § 19-2830.1 (1980) (declared unconstitutional for zoning decisions
in Wenderoth v. City of Fort Smith, 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971)).
37. Id.
38. Wright v. City of Little Rock, 245 Ark. 355,432 S.W.2d 488 (1968); Arkansas Power
& Light Co. v. City of Little Rock, 243 Ark. 290,420 S.W.2d 85 (1967); City of Little Rock v.
Leawood Property Owners Ass'n, 242 Ark. 451, 413 S.W.2d 877 (1967).
39. 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971).
40. Id. at 345, 472 S.W.2d at 75.
41. Id. at 347, 472 S.W.2d at 76 (unconstitutional as applied to zoning ordinances).
42. Eg., City of Conway v. Conway Housing Auth., 266 Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10
(1979); City of Batesville v. Grace, 259 Ark. 493, 534 S.W.2d 224 (1976); City of North Little
Rock v. Linn, 252 Ark. 364, 479 S.W.2d 236 (1972); see Newbern, Zoning Flexibility: Bored
ofAdjustment?, 30 ARK. L. REv. 491, 501 (1977); see also Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslav-
sky, 626 F.2d 607, 613 (8th Cir. 1980) (citing Wenderoth as authority for the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review).
43. 266 Ark. 384, 583 S.W.2d 72 (1979).
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Arkansas Supreme Court were explained: "The chancellor does not
try a city zoning decision de novo but, instead, determines whether
the city's action was arbitrary . . [The Arkansas Supreme Court]
only determines whether the chancellor's finding was contrary to the
preponderance of the evidence.""4 Taylor represents a renewed
awareness of the need to maintain the integrity of the planning and
zoning process in Arkansas. 5
JUDICIAL ZONING
Considering the amount of litigation which zoning generates,
the United States Supreme Court has heard relatively few cases.46
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas47 Justice Marshall explained what
the standard of judicial review should be:
I therefore continue to adhere to the principal of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., . . that deference should be given to govern-
mental judgments concerning proper land-use allocation. That
deference is a principle which has served this Court well and
which is necessary for the continued development of effective
zoning and land-use control mechanisms.48
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court has purported to adopt
the deferential 49 standard of review, it has not always applied that
standard. In many cases the court has failed to defer to the city
board's substantive decision, conducted its own inquiry, and fash-
ioned remedies which reflect its view of the facts. Thus, the court
has often acted in the capacity of a "super" zoning commission. °
44. Id. at 388, 583 S.W.2d at 74.
45. Wright, supra note 14, at 442.
46. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 109 (1966). In explaining the reluctance of
the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari in zoning cases, Babcock says that since
Neclow,
the United States Supreme Court has stoutly resisted attempts to foist on it respon-
sibility in this area. I would like to believe that among the justices of our highest
court, conservative or liberal, Democrat or Republican, southerner or Yankee, cor-
porate lawyer or ex-professor, there has been consensus on only one point: if we
cherish our equilibrium, never agree to review a zoning case.
Id. at 110.
47. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
48. Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The majority held that the
zoning ordinance was constitutional because it was reasonable, not arbitrary. Justice Mar-
shall, dissenting on the main issue, an exclusionary zoning question, agreed with the Court
in this standard of review.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
50. See, e.g., Olsen v. City of Little Rock, 241 Ark. 155, 406 S.w.2d 706 (1966); City of
Little Rock v. Miles, 240 Ark. 735, 401 S.W.2d 741 (1966); Downs v. City of Little Rock, 240
Ark. 623, 401 S.W.2d 210 (1966); City of Little Rock v. Gardner, 239 Ark. 54, 386 S.W.2d
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NOTES
This judicial zoning began in 1964 with Litle Rock v. Andres,5'
but the court in City of Conway v. Conway Housing Authority52 dis-
couraged this practice. In Conway the court found the planning
commission's refusal to rezone arbitrary and remanded with direc-
tions to rezone the property.53 However, the court would not rezone
the property judicially, saying, "Courts are not super zoning com-
missions and have no authority to classify property according to
zones." 54 Thus, the Arkansas Court echoed Justice Marshall, who
said in Belle Terre that courts should not sit as a zoning board of
appeals.5
City of Little Rock v. Breeding
In Ciy of Little Rock v. Breeding56 the court acknowledged not
only the legislative nature of zoning decisions,57 but also that judi-
cial intrusion upon this legislative prerogative would violate the
constitutional requirement of separation of powers. 58 Recognizing
the judiciary's limited function in reviewing a legislative decision,
the court59 stated that the only question before the chancellor or the
court was whether the city had acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or un-
reasonably. The question was not whether "the Chancellor, or this
court, agrees with [the city's] decision or determines that it is wise or
unwise or whether it is supported by the greater weight of evi-
dence."' 60 The court said that a presumption exists that the city
board of directors acted in a reasonable manner, and as long as it
923 (1965); City of Little Rock v. Andres, 237 Ark. 658, 375 S.W.2d 370 (1964); City of Little
Rock v. Joyner, 212 Ark. 508, 206 S.W.2d 446 (1947); City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 270
Ark. 752, 606 S.W.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 273 Ark. 437, 619 S.W.2d 664 (1981).
51. 237 Ark. 658, 375 S.W.2d 370 (1964).
52. 266 Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10 (1979).
53. Id. at 410, 584 S.W.2d at 14.
54. Id. at 409, 584 S.w.2d at 13.
55. 416 U.S. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Both the positive and negative effects of
judicial zoning are analyzed in Note, The Rezoning Dilemma: What May a Court Do With
an Invalid Zoning Classjfcation?, 25 S.D.L. REV. 116 (1980). When the remedy is limited to
judicial invalidation of an exclusionary zoning ordinance, little relief is provided to the per-
sons excluded from the community. For an examination of this complex problem, refer to
Hartman, Beyond Invalidation: The Judicial Power to Zone, 9 URB. L.J. 159 (1975).
56. 273 Ark. 437, 619 S.W.2d 664 (1981).
57. Id. at 442, 619 S.W.2d at 667. The Arkansas legislature delegated the power of
comprehensive planning and zoning to municipalities in ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-2804 to
-2830 (1980).
58. 273 Ark. at 444, 619 S.W.2d at 668 (citing Wenderoth v. City of Forth Smith, 251
Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971)).
59. Sidney H. McCollum, serving as Special Justice, delivered the opinion of the court.
60. 273 Ark. at 445-46, 619 S.W.2d at 668.
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had a reasonable basis for its decision, the court would uphold that
decision.6'
The chancellor did not focus his inquiry on the reasonable basis
for the board's decision because he applied the Pfefer rule.62 The
Arkansas Supreme Court avoided applying the Pfeifer rule in Breed-
ing by narrowly interpreting the phrase "adjacent to an existing and
expanding business district. ' 63 The court noted that responsible
planning of a city and application of the Pfeifer rule are mutually
exclusive64 and concluded that Pfeifer has very limited applicability
and little, if any, validity.65
Aside from Pfefer considerations, the court acknowledged that
the appellees had presented considerable evidence supporting their
66Th correquest for commercial zoning. The court said, however, that the
power to weigh these arguments rests with the city board and not
with the chancellor or a reviewing court.67 The court applied the
preponderance of the evidence test to the question whether there
was a reasonable basis for the city board's decision.68 They found
that the board's reliance on the expertise of the planning staff sup-
plied that reasonable basis, and, therefore, this decision was not ar-
bitrary or capricious.69
Finally, the court explained that it is not within judicial power
to rezone property, because this is a legislative power given by the
Arkansas Legislature to the governing board of a city.70 Since the
61. Id. at 445, 619 S.W.2d at 668.
62. Id. at 446, 619 S.W.2d at 669 (citing City of Little Rock v. Pfeifer, 169 Ark. 1027,
277 S.W. 883 (1925)). The Pfe(fer rule is that any attempt to restrict the rights of a person
owning property next to an established and expanding business district is arbitrary.
63. 273 Ark. at 449, 619 S.W.2d at 670 (court's emphasis). Vacant land was not within a
"business district" just because it was zoned commercial or because there were commercial
establishments nearby. The land was not "adjacent to" a business district if the business was
across the street or in the sixty-five acre tract.
64. Id. at 448, 619 S.W.2d at 670 (citing City of Conway v. Conway Housing Auth., 266
Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10 (1979)).
65. 273 Ark. at 448, 619 S.W.2d at 670. See Wright, supra note 14, at 421, section
entitled An Arkansas Oddity: The "'Pfeifer Rule" and its Lingering Demise.
66. 273 Ark. at 452, 619 S.W.2d at 672. The appellees argued that without the rezoning,
the tract could not be put to its highest and best use, and further that the planning staffs
report listed a lack of adverse effects on the immediate area as a result of the requested
rezoning. Id. at 451, 619 S.W.2d at 672.
67. Id. at 452, 619 S.W.2d at 672.
68. Id. at 453, 619 S.W.2d at 672.
69. Id. The planning staff's findings indicated that more property had been designated
for commercial use than was actually needed or used.
70. Id. (citing City of Conway v. Conway Housing Auth., 266 Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10
(1979); City of Batesville v. Grace, 259 Ark. 493, 534 S.W.2d 224 (1976)).
NOTES
lower court had placed the property in a specific zone, the court said
it had acted beyond its power. The court found that an injunction
was the only proper judicial remedy.7'
Breeding is significant because it answers several questions of
vital importance in zoning litigation in Arkansas. When the court of
appeals' 72 analysis is contrasted with the supreme court's analysis, it
is apparent that Breeding clarified much of the confusion that per-
meated previous holdings.
The court of appeals applied a broad interpretation of the Pfei-
fer rule, finding the Breeding tract to be adjacent to an existing and
expanding business district.73 The court stated that the property is
part of, and surrounded by, approximately sixty-five acres of land
either used or zoned for commercial purposes.74
In contrast, the supreme court found that none of the surround-
ing land could be considered a "business district," because there was
no actual commercial development on any adjacent property.75 By
narrowing the interpretation of "adjacent to an existing and ex-
panding business district," the supreme court further limited the fu-
ture use of this rule.
While the chancery court actually rezoned the property, the
supreme court said zoning is beyond a court's power.76  The
supreme court created a new judicial limitation by stating that an
injunction is the only proper judicial action in a zoning case.77
Both courts said they used the arbitrary, capricious, and unrea-
sonable standard to review the decision of the board of directors.
However, the court of appeals appeared to review the evidence the
chancellor used in making his decision and to hold that his decision
was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 78 The supreme
court made it clear that there is only one question to be reviewed at
any level: Did the city board have a reasonable basis for its deci-
sion?79 In delivering this definitive opinion, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has clarified and changed Arkansas zoning law.8
71. Id.
72. 270 Ark. at 762, 606 S.W.2d at 125.
73. Id. at 760-61, 606 S.W.2d at 124.
74. Id. at 754, 606 S.w.2d at 121.
75. 273 Ark. at 449, 619 S.w.2d at 670.
76. Id. at 453, 619 S.W.2d at 672-73.
77. Id.
78. 270 Ark. at 760, 606 S.W.2d at 124.
79. 273 Ark. at 445, 452, 619 S.W.2d at 668, 672.
80. The court followed the reasoning of Breeding in McMinn v. City of Little Rock, No.
82-20 (Ark. Apr. 12, 1982).
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The ultimate effect of Breeding on zoning depends both on the
litigants' and the planning commissions' reactions. If the reasonable
basis measure is consistently applied to zoning cases, the future Ar-
kansas zoning litigant will have an "extraordinary burden" 8l when
he contests a city board's decision. When the chances of judicial
success are unlikely, the land developer, who has a great deal at
stake financially, may put his energy and resources into influencing
the local political body. This pressure on the local zoning commis-
sion, when successful, results in rezoning based on political consid-
erations rather than planning expertise.
It is equally possible that a more positive effect will flow from
the added importance of the zoning commission's decisions. As the
commission and its reviewing board realize the near finality of their
deliberations, they may place greater reliance on the objective ex-
pertise of the city planning department. Then the entire commu-
nity's needs, as projected by people educated and employed to stay
abreast of them, will be a vital part of each decision. The more
limited judicial role could strengthen the nexus between planning
and zoning, resulting in a benefit to all.
Audrey Riemer Evans
81. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 8, at § 3.16 n.60.
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